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1. The reference to "community associations" means any mandatory membership
corporation tied to the ownership of real property, which corporation has a right of lien for the
collection of assessments. See FLA. STAT. § 468.431(1) (2001). The most common forms of
community associations are condominium associations, cooperative associations, and
homeowners' associations. This survey covers 2001 Florida legislation and.appellate court
cases from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001. Condominium related arbitration decisions,
Declaratory Statements, and Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile
Home rules should also be examined by readers for a comprehensive review of legal
authorities affecting Florida community associations for the period covered by this survey.
Further, this survey does not cover issues involving timeshare developments, nor mobile home
parks.
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I. LEGISLATION
A. Condominiums
The most notable aspect of condominium legislation considered by the
2001 Florida Legislature was the bills that were not passed out of the
session. Indeed, the only bill involving chapter 718 that was ultimately
approved was a reviser's bill.2 Among the potentially significant bills that
did not pass, including a couple that died on the calendar in the waning
moments of the session, were the following: 1) proposed amendments to
chapter 718 dealing with a variety of operational issues, including the ability
to amend condominium declarations to restrict rental rights, 3 the ability to
amend documents regarding alterations of common elements,4 amendments
regarding the transfer of limited common element rights,5 and miscellaneous
other operational provisions;6 2) reorganization of the Department of
Business and Professional Regulation, including the elimination of
condominium arbitration;7 3) a proposal to substantially limit the scope of
warranty rights enjoyed by condominium unit owners and their associations
regarding construction deficiencies; 8 and 4) a proposed amendment to
eliminate the contention9 that documentary stamps be paid on a community
association's foreclosure of its lien interests.
10
2. H.R. 667, 2001 Leg., (Fla. 2001). H.R. 667 corrects numerous perceived
typographical and citation errors in various sections of the Florida Statutes, including several
amendments to chapter 718. This bill was approved by the Governor on May 25, 2001, 2001-
64 Fla. Laws, effective July 3, 2001.
3. See Woodside Village Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Jahren, 754 So. 2d 831, 833 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
4. See Wellington Prop. Mgmt. v. "Parc Corniche Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 755 So. 2d
824, 825 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
5. See Brown v. Rice, 716 So. 2d 807, 808 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); 2000-302,
§ 50 Fla. Laws.
6. H.R. 1907, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted). Also treated at H.B.
207; S.B. 348 and S.B. 2210.
7. H.R. 1923, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
8. S. 1742, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
9. See State v. 100 La Peninsula Condo. Ass'n, Inc., Case No. 99-6646, Leon
County, Florida (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
10. H.R. 1835, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
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B. Cooperatives
To the knowledge of the author, no bills affecting cooperatives or
cooperative associations" were considered nor adopted during the 2001
legislative session.
C. Homeowners'Associations
Likewise, no substantial legislation directly affecting the operation of
homeowners' associations was passed during the legislative session. A local
bill was considered which would have permitted Marion County to adopt
special legislation for homeowners' associations. 12 A bill which did pass,
but was vetoed by the Governor,'3 would have permitted homeowners'
associations to apply for the vacation of public roads and the simultaneous
conveyance of the same to a residential homeowners' association for the
purpose of creating a gated subdivision upon a vote of four-fifths of the
owners therein.
One clause that was added to the homeowners' association statute was a
newly enacted section 720.3075 of the Florida Statutes.1 4 This law, dealing
with a variety of other topics,15 provides that any homeowners' association
documents, including declarations of covenants, articles of incorporation, or
bylaws, entered into after October 1, 2001, "may not prohibit any property
owner from implementing Xeriscape or "Florida-friendly landscape as
defined in section 373.185(1)" of the Florida Statutes. 6 The statute defines
"Xeriscape" or "Florida-friendly landscape" as "quality landscapes that
conserve water and protect the environment and are adaptable to local
conditions and which are drought tolerant.,
17
11. See FLA. STAT. § 719 (2001).
12. H.R. 1901, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
13. H.R. 1053, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (unenacted).
14. FLA. STAT. § 720.3075 (2001).
15. Including a county's authority to convey property, tax deed application
procedures, and tourist taxes. Id.
16. FLA. STAT. § 720.3075 (2001).
17. FLA. STAT. § 373.185 (2001).
2001]
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D. Miscellaneous Legislation Affecting Community Association Operations
The 2001 Florida Legislature amended section 760 of the Florida
Statutes, regulating, inter alia, "housing for older persons."'" The 2001
amendment provides that a community claiming to be exempt from
prohibitions of state law against discrimination on the basis of familial
status,' 9 must register with the Florida Commission on Human Relations
("Commission") stating that the community complies with the requirements
of the law. The statute provides that a letter shall be submitted on the
letterhead of the community and shall be signed by the president of the
community. 21 Registration must be renewed biannually.22 Unfortunately,
the filing of these registration forms confers no presumption of compliance
with the law, and failure to comply with the law does not disqualify a
community from holding itself out as "fifty-five and over housing."
The Commission is required to make information in the registry
available to the public, and the Commission shall include this information on
23
an Internet website. The Commission has also promulgated rules, which
were scheduled for a potential Rule Development Workshop on September
7, 2001.
24
Section 482 of the Florida Statutes, relevant to pest control, was also
amended in the 2001 Legislature.2 Newly enacted section 482.242(1)(c)(1)
of the Florida Statutes permits local governments to require, for multi-
complex dwellings in excess of ten units, annual inspections for termite
activity or damage, as well as the remediation of same. It is important to
note that this law does not mandate the inspections and treatment, but simply
permits local governments to adopt such standards; pest control is generally
preempted by state regulation and is not susceptible to local regulation.
18. FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4) (2001).
19. For example, "fifty-five and over communities."
20. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.29(4)(e), .31 (2001).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Housing for Older Persons Registration and Documentation, 27 Fla. Admin.
Weekly 3907 (proposed Aug. 24, 2001) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4)(e) (2001)).
24. See FLA. STAT. § 760.29(4)(e) (2001).
25. FLA. STAT. § 725.06 (2001).
26. Id.
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For the second time in as many years, 27 section 725.06 of the Florida
Statutes, which regulates indemnity provisions in construction contracts, was
amended with an effective date of July 1, 2001.28
The new statute applies to any construction contract entered into on or
after July 1, 2001.29 Included within the ambit of the law are not only
contracts directly between the owner and the contractor, but also contracts
with architects, engineers and subcontractors.3 Indemnification provisions
in such contracts, which do not comply with the law, are declared void and
unenforceable.31 In order to be valid, an indemnity clause must contain a
dollar limit on the obligations of the indemnitor. 2 The indemnity obliga-
tions must bear a commercially reasonable relationship to the value of the
work.33 Unless otherwise provided in the agreement between the parties, one
million dollars is established as the per se minimum level of reasonable
indemnity undertakings.
34
The new proviso also permits the indemnitor to indemnify the
indemnitee for the indemnitee's own negligence, if so provided in the
agreement between the parties.3 5 However, the law specifically limits the
parameters of such undertakings, and excludes indemnification caused by
"gross negligence, or willful, wanton or intentional misconduct," or for
"statutory violation or punitive damages except and to the extent the
statutory violation or punitive damages are caused by or result from the acts
or omissions" of the indemnitor, or for those acts the indemnitor is
responsible.36
Attorneys for community associations are frequently called upon by
their clients to prepare and/or review various forms of construction related
agreements, which will be subject to this statute. Extreme care should be
taken in insuring that the relevant provisions of the agreement comply with
the statute, particularly when "industry boilerplate" forms, such as those
27. Ch. 2001-372, § 31, 2001 Fla. Laws 4334 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 725.06
(2001)).
28. Ch. 2001-211, § 10, 2001 Fla. Laws 1887-88 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
725.06 (2001)).
29. FLA. STAT. § 725.06(1) (2001).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. § 725.06(1).
35. § 725.06(1)(c).
36. Id.
2001]
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used by the American Institute of Architects, or similar organizations, form
the basis of the contract documents.
II. APPELLATE CASE LAW
A. Introduction
Although the period encompassed by this survey was unusually quiet in
terms of legislation,37 there was no shortage of appellate case law impacting
the operation of community associations. One interesting side note is that
the substantial amendments to the condominium statute in the early 1990s, 
8
which mandated arbitration of many condominium "disputes," 39 have
resulted in the near elimination of what many consider as "trivial"
condomnium controversies 40 being decided in the appellate courts. Indeed,
with the exception of a jurisdiction case4' and a couple of collection related
cases,42 there were no appellate decisions involving what has historically
been the fodder of condominium litigation. This is a clear departure from
the volume of appellate court cases prior to the implementation of the
arbitration program. Thus, to the extent the legislature sought to avoid
crowding the circuit courts with disputes of this nature,43 the program
appears to be accomplishing that result, at least at the appellate court level.
Hopefully, future efforts in the legislature to address the operation of the
arbitration program" will be undertaken with due regard for what has gone
before.
37. Several Tallahassee lobbyists have advised author that the activity surrounding the
Bush/Gore Presidential contest, including involvement by the Florida Legislature, resulted in
delays in the pre-session committee process, which precluded many legislative initiatives,
even if uncontested, from being guided through the process.
38. FLA. STAT. § 718.111 (1991).
39. See FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(l) (2001) (defining "disputes").
40. By way of example, but not limitation, these include pet cases, vehicle parking
controversies, and election challenges.
41. Fla. Tower Condo., Inc. v. Mindes, 770 So. 2d 210, 211 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2000)
42. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. The Gardens N. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 764 So. 2d
883, 884 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Schooner Oaks Ltd. Co. v. Schooner Oaks Condo.
Ass'n, Inc., 776 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
43. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255 (2001).
44. H.R. 1923, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001).
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B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty/Tort Claims
The period covered by the survey includes what appears to be an
unusual number of cases involving breach of fiduciary duty or intentional
tort claims in varying forms. The condominium statute45 provides that each
officer and director has a fiduciary relationship to the unit owners. Further,
the statute confers a cause of action by unit owners or the Association,
against directors who willfully or knowingly fail to comply with the law," or
directors designated by the developer, for actions taken by them prior to the
time control of the Association 47 is assumed by unit owners other than the
developer.4 8 The cooperative statute49 contains similar provisions.50  The
statute applicable to homeowners associations 51 similarly imposes a
fiduciary duty on officers and directors 2 and likewise confers a cause of
action in favor of the Association or a homeowner against directors who
willfully and knowingly fail to comply with the law. 3 Notably missing from
the parallel clause in the statute for condominium associations is the direct
conferral of a cause of action against directors appointed by the developer
for pre-turnover acts or omissions.
The case of Stevens v. Cricket Club Condominium, Inc.5 although
benign in result, creates a basis for substantial concern for condominium
associations and their boards of directors.55 According to the per curiam
decision, at the time the underlying dispute went to trial, only counts III and
V of the five count complaint remained.56
Count M, presented in a class action capacity,57 sought compensatory
damages for breach of fiduciary duty against the Association.58 The plaintiff
45. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(1)(a) (2001).
46. § 718.303(1)(d) (2001).
47. Commonly referred to as "turnover"
48. § 718.303(I)(d).
49. § 719.104.
50. § 719.303(1)(c)-(d).
51. § 720.301.
52. See § 720.303(1).
53. See § 720.305(1)(c).
54. 784 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 518.
57. See Cricket Club Condo., Inc. v. Stevens, 695 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).
58. Stevens, 784 So. 2d at 518.
2001]
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complained that the Association's board made "false statements concerning
new wiring and price savings in regard to cable television service.
' 59
Count V, which again pled the unit owner's putative status as class
representative, also sounded in breach of fiduciary duty.6° Stevens alleged
that the board of directors spent funds from a 1992 special assessment on
items other than those set forth in the "Notice of Special Assessment."
6
'
Apparently, $50,000 was assessed to repair the pool area, however the board
652 63did not have that work done. The funds were instead largely used to
repair the south terrace area, which was described as an area leading to the
pool.
64
The trial court found in favor of the Association on count In (the cable
television claim).65 In regard to count V, the trial court ruled in favor of the
unit owner, concluding that he had sustained his burden of proof on the
66
misapplication of the 1992 special assessment. However, the trial court
awarded only nominal damages in the amount of $1.6 7 The unit owner
appealed the trial court's judgment on count III and the award of only
nominal damages on count V. The Association cross appealed the finding
of liability on count V.6 9 Citing GNB, Inc. v. United Danco Batteries, Inc.,
7
the reviewing appellate panel indicated it would not reweigh the evidence,
and that the record supported the trial court's conclusions.7'
With regard to count III (the cable television issue), the court noted that
the Association held a "town meeting" to explain cable television options
and that various reports were made available for inspection by the unit
owners. The court concluded that the board of directors did not mislead
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Except for about $2000 which was used for cleaning the pool. Stevens, 784 So.
2d at 518.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Stevens, 784 So. 2d at 518.
69. Id.
70. 627 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
71. Stevens, 718 So. 2d at 518.
72. Id. at 519.
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the unit owners, but allowed them to draw their own conclusions as to which
cable company should be chosen.
73
Although the rationale for the court's affnrmance of the dismissal of
count Il is brief, the troubling aspect is the suggestion that under different
factual circumstances, a prima facie case for breach of fiduciary duty could
have been made. The courts have historically given condominium
association boards wide "business judgment" latitude 4 and indeed the
condominium statute permits the board of directors to normally, absent a
contrary restriction in the declaration of condominium, choose the bulk cable
provider. Hopefully, the court's disposition of count Ill will not be
construed to imply a broader standard of liability than Florida's case law
currently provides.
The more troubling aspect of the court's decision in Stevens is the
affirmance of count V and the award of nominal damages. Even though it
was not contested that the repair of the south terrace area was a proper
function of the Association, the court concluded that the Association "did
misapply funds."" Although the decision does not include a detailed review
of the underlying facts in the matter, the court does note that when Mr.
Stevens charged the board with "misapplying" the funds, the board returned
the assessment to the unit owners, and thereafter, presumably properly,
specially assessed the funds necessary to repair the south terrace.78 Although
the use of special assessment funds for purposes other than that for which
they were levied appears to violate the condominium statute,79 the court does
not address 8° why the dispute did not become moot when the assessment was
returned. 8' Clearly, of greatest practical significance to the Association is
the fact that Mr. Stevens would presumably be declared the "prevailing
party" in count V, and as such, would be entitled to the recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees incurred with the prosecution of that count.
82
73. Id.
74. Farrington v. Casa Solana Condo. Ass'n, 517 So. 2d 70, 72 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1987).
75. Id. FLA. STAT. § 718.115(l)(d) (2001).
76. See, e.g., Perlow v. Goldberg, 700 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
77. Stevens, 784 So. 2d at 519.
78. Id.
79. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(c) (2001).
80. It is unknown whether the issue was raised in the pleading or the briefs.
81. See, e.g., 51 Island Way Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Williams, 458 So. 2d 364, 367
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
82. FLA. STAT. § 718.303(1) (2001).
2001]
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Another breach of fiduciary duty case which is troubling from the
perspective of unit owner or homeowner controlled associations is Turkey
Creek Master Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Hope.83 In this case, a homeowners
association sued the officers and directors of the Association who had been
appointed by the developer. 84 The Association's claims sounded in breach
of fiduciary duty, conversion, breach of contract, and accounting.8 5  In
connection with the underlying action, the trial court entered an order that
required the Association to pay the attorney's fees of the developer's board
appointees.86 The basis of the trial court's award was section 607.0850(9) of
the Florida Statutes, the section of the corporation laws applicable to
indemnification. The statute provides that a trial court may order a
corporate plaintiff to indemnify a defendant for fees and expenses incurred
in defending a suit filed by the corporation against one or more of its
directors or employees. 88  The statute limits indemnification in such
situations to cases where the court finds that the defendant or defendants are
"fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification or advancement of
expenses or both, in view of all of the relevant circumstances .... ."89
Although disagreeing with the Association's contention that the trial
court should have dismissed the claim to indemnification entitlement on the
pleadings, the appellate court ruled that the trial court did not set forth a
sufficient basis for determining whether the "fairly and reasonably"
entitlement standard was met, nor did the trial court explicate the "relevant
circumstances" upon which such judgment was rendered. 90 The parties
stipulated that the trial courts order of indemnification was based upon the
pleadings; the appellate panel, writing per curiam, sent the order back to the
trial court, on remand, for reconsideration in light of the standards explicated
in the opinion.91
In dicta, the appellate court noted that the indemnification statute is
more likely to be applied when a corporate employee or director is sued by a
third party in relation to the actions of the employee or director as a
83. 766 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
84. Id. at 1246.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Although most condominium and homeowners associations are not-for-profit
corporations, the indemnity provisions of the Florida Business Corporation Act are
incorporated into the Florida Not-for-Profit Corporation Act. FLA. STAT. § 617.0831 (2000).
88. § 607.0850(9).
89. Id.
90. Turkey Creek, 766 So. 2d at 1246.
91. Id. at 1246-47.
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corporate agent. 92 Conceding that the statute recognizes circumstances
where the corporation must indemnify the agent it is suing, the court further
noted that, since the corporation faces the possibility of being required to
pay the legal fees and the expenses of the very party it is suing, it is
"especially important to determine whether the circumstances justify a
finding that the agent is reasonably entitled to indemnification."
93
Perhaps most puzzling, the Turkey Creek court does not discuss the
effect of section 617.0831 of the Florida Not-for-Profit Corporation Act
which provides that "the term director, as used in section 617.0850, does not
include a director appointed by the developer to the board of directors of a
condominium association under chapter 718, a cooperative association under
chapter 719, a homeowners association defined in section 720.301, or a
timeshare managing entity under chapter 721." 94 Unfortunately, the court's
decision does little to develop objective standards in the law as it pertains to
the unique circumstances of the relationship between associations and those
directors who were appointed by the developer.
Obviously, the specter of paying a developer-appointee's attorney's
fees, pursuant to the corporate indemnification statute, could create a
chilling affect on an associations' vindication of legal rights, and the pursuit
of recognized causes of action. Interestingly, the court does not address the
standards for indemnification for cases of this nature, as enunciated in Old
Port Cove Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Ecclestone.95 In Old Port Cove,
the Association sued the principal in the development entity, also a member
of the Association's board, for selling the road system within the develop-
ment back to the Association at a price of approximately two million
96dollars. The developer prevailed on the Association's claim of breach of
fiduciary duty.97 The trial court awarded Mr. Ecclestone his attorney's fees,
based upon language in the Association's articles of incorporation, which
entitled directors of the Association to indemnification. 98 The appellate
court, relying on the then existing version of the law struck down the
indemnification award.99 The Old Port Cove court also cited Penthouse
92. Id. at 1247.
93. Id.
94. FLA. STAT. § 617.0831 (2000).
95. 500 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
96. Id. at 332.
97. Id. at 333.
98. Id. at 336.
99. Id. at 335. The version of the indemnification statute litigated in Turkey Creek is
different than the version that existed when the Old Port Cove case was decided.
2001]
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North Ass'n, Inc. v. Lombardi,1°° where the Supreme Court of Florida held,
on essentially public policy grounds, that the indemnification provision in
the articles of incorporation of a condominium association could not be
invoked to support a claim by the developer-appointees to the board.'0 1
Another "pre-turnover" breach of fiduciary duty type case, 10 Larsen v.
Island Developers, Ltd. 103 has the twist of the not-for-profit corporation
structured as an "equity club.' 04 At issue in the case was the trial court's
dismissal of the derivative action complaint, brought by members of the
club, against the developer of Fisher Island, an exclusive development in
Miami-Dade County. 05
According to the complaint, the club's developer enticed prospective
purchasers of equity memberships in the club on the basis of representations
that a right of first refusal existed for undeveloped land on Fisher Island and
a similar right with respect to the developer's unsold condominium units, if
the developer decided to offer the units for sale below a stated price level.
t°6
The developer ostensibly breached the agreement by marketing to third
parties its remaining undeveloped land, along with its inventory of unsold
condominium units.'07 After having sold the property in question, the
developer gave notice of a proposed sale to its own employee, as president of
the club, but provided no opportunity to purchase. 10 8
The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that derivative actions
could not be brought for the benefit of, or on behalf of, not-for-profit
corporations. 0 9 The trial court's ruling was based upon a 1993 amendment
to chapter 617110 which "burned the bridge" between that statute and chapter
100. 461 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1984).
101. Id. at 1351.
102. The reported decision does not specifically identify the theories of action pled in
the case. The case does, however, involve actions of the developer's appointee to the board.
103. 769 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
104. Id. Although the term "equity club" has no statutory definition, it generally
involves property interests and use rights with respect to recreational amenities (golf courses,
country clubs, etc.) which are not tied to the ownership of real estate, and which do not
involve mandatory membership in a community association. Community association
practitioners are, however, frequently called upon to address issues pertaining to "equity
clubs," which are often included as a feature of master planned developments.
105. Larsen, 769 So. 2d at 1071.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1072.
110. Larsen, 769 So. 2d at 1071 (citing The Florida Not-for-Profit Corporation Law,
section 617.1908 of the Florida Statutes).
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607."' The appellate court acknowledged that chapter 617 contains no
specific grant of authority to bring a derivative action on behalf of a not-for-
profit corporation.' 12 However, the court further noted that the derivative
rights conferred upon shareholders in corporations for profit were not
initially derived from the legislature, but granted at common law as an
equitable remedy."13
Thus, and in light of there being no specific prohibition in chapter 617
against derivative suits, the court applied the same rationale that led to
imposition of derivative action rights at common law for profit making
corporations." 4 The court's opinion, written by Judge Ramirez, confesses
that the intent of the 1993 amendments to the relevant statute is unclear."
5
The court reasoned, however, that there were likely other reasons why the
statute was amended, and there was no indicia of legislative intent to
"completely eliminate a long-recognized, common law cause of action."11 6
Going a step further, the court went on to say that, "[t]o hold otherwise could
likely raise the possibility of an unconstitutional restriction on access to
courts." ' 17  The procedural vehicle of a derivative suit is a potentially
important right to homeowners or unit owners within associations still
controlled by developers. Indeed, prior to the definitive announcement of
the Larsen court, the existence or non existence of derivative actions for not-
for-profit corporations remained an open question since the 1993 statutory
amendments.
A relatively straightforward breach of fiduciary duty case, Florida
Discount Properties, Inc. v. Windermere Condominium, Inc., s presents a
fact pattern in a unit owner-controlled association which is most notable for
the ostensible audacity of the two condominium association directors
involved." 9 Harold Glover and Jack Gerzina sat on the board of directors of
Windermere Condominium, Inc.12° Windermere Condominium was subject
to a "recreation lease.'' Over a period of some twenty five years, the
111. Id. (citing The Florida Business Corporation Act, section 607 of the Florida
Statutes).
112. Id. at 1072.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Larsen, 769 So. 2d at 1072.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 786 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
119. Id. at 1272-73.
120. Id. at 1271-72.
121. Id. at 1272; FLA. STAT. § 718.401 (1997).
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association paid a total of $750,000 in lease payments.122 In 1995, the board
of the association voted to buy out the lease.12' The association was able to
negotiate a purchase price with the developer of $35,000.124 At a December
1996 Board meeting, Gerzina and Glover, along with the Association's
attorney, urged the association to contest the lease based upon the argument
that it was unconscionable. 125 Initially, a quorum was not present because
only three of the seven directors were at the meeting.126 Apparently at the
attorney's recommendation, two more Board members were appointed,
makin the Board nine members in total, and thus creating a quorum of
five.
12f
Subsequently, a dispute in the condominium developed as to who was
lawfully on the Board.128 A receiver was appointed in 1997 to operate the
association and Gerzina and Glover were recalled from the Board, as
ultimately confirmed by an arbitrator.129 Prior to their removal from the
board, however, Gerzina and Glover began negotiating with the recreation
lease's owner to purchase the recreational lease property.1 30 A week after
Gerzina and Glover were recalled from the board, they entered into a
contract to purchase the property from the owner. 131 Thereafter, they filed
suit against the association to collect back rents. 32 Although the opinion,
written by Judge Stevenson, does not involve a detailed recitation of the trial
court's legal findings, the appellate court summarily upheld the trial court's
order that Gerzina and Glover "utilized their position on the [board] to
negotiate an advantageous economic position for themselves personally to
the detriment of Windermere. ' 33  The trial court also ordered that the
association be given a right of first refusal to purchase the property for
122. Id.
123. Fla. Disc. Props., Inc., 786 So. 2d at 1272.
124. Id. The decision does not specify why such an apparently low purchase price was
involved in light of the fact that the lease presumably provided a substantial income stream.
Id. at 1271-73.
125. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.122(1)(a)(i) (1997) ("detailing guidelines for
determining whether a lease is presumptively unconscionable.")).
126 Fla. Disc. Props., Inc., 786 So. 2d at 1272.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1272-73.
131. Fla. Disc. Props., Inc., 786 So. 2d at 1273.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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$20,000, the same amount Gerzina and Glover paid for it."' One of the
issues on appeal was whether or not the subject lease was subject to the right
of first refusal found in section 718.401(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes.13 5 The
appellate court found that it was not necessary to reach this question,
because the trial judge properly granted the right of first refusal based on
Gerzina's and Glover's "disgorgment for usurping the corporate opportu-
nity.,,136
Unfortunately, it is not uncommon in condominium governance for
disputes to erupt as to who is, or is not, legally seated on the Board. The
action of appointing two directors as an emergency matter at a Board
meeting certainly seems suspect, although the relevant provisions of the
association's bylaws are not set forth in the decision.1 37 However, when unit
owners and Board members engage in conduct that implicates personal profit
making pertinent to condominium business, this case drives home the fact
that the liability limitations and immunities generally sprinkled throughout
the applicable statutes and relevant case law will find no application.
The final tort based conduct related case, Hollywood Lakes Country
138Club, Inc. v. Community Ass'n Services, Inc., presents yet another twist.
Here, it was the developer who sued a management company, arising out of
services provided by the management company regarding the community the
developer had developed. 139 The developer's complaint sounded in breach
of contract, misrepresentation, equitable subrogation, and malpractice. 40
The "trial court dismissed the fourth amended complaint with prejudice,"
resulting in the appeal.1
41
The issue in the underlying dispute was whether the management
company hired by the developer-controlled association failed to take
appropriate steps to collect assessments from unit owners.' 42 The developer
claimed to be damaged since the governing documents for the community
required the developer to fund any shortfalls in assessments collected from'43
non-developer unit owners. The legal hurdle faced by the developer was
that the management agreement was between the association and the
134. Id.
135. The 1997 version of the statute was stated to apply to these proceedings. Id.
136. Fla. Disc. Props., Inc., 786 So. 2d at 1273.
137. See id. at 1271-73.
138. 770 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
139. Id. at717.
140. ld.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 718.
143. Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 770 So. 2d at 718.
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management company, not the developer and the management company.144
The appellate court held that the fourth amended complaint contained all of
the necessary allegations to sustain a prima facie case for fraud (misrepre-
sentation) by the management company as to the developer. 45 Citing
applicable authorities, the court held that the developer sufficiently alleged
misrepresentations by the management company, which caused the
developer to refrain from independently acting to collect assessments.'4
The court also addressed the dismissal of the count for equitable
subrogation. 47 Citing relevant authorities, and primarily relying on National
Union Fire Insurance Co. v. KPMG Peat Marwick,14s the Fourth District's
panel, through Chief Judge Warner, found sufficient grounds to sustain a
prima facie case for a claim of equitable subrogation. 4 9 The court ruled that
the debt was due to the association from the individual homeowners, the
management company was responsible for collecting the debt, and the
management company's negligence caused the loss of the assessment. 50
The developer's payment of that debt allows it to succeed to the position of
the original creditor, the association, under the doctrine of equitable
subrogation. 15
The court did, however, affirm the dismissal of a breach of contract
count, which had been pled under a third party beneficiary theory. 52 Citing
Caretta Trucking, Inc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd., 53 the court found that
there was no indication that both parties to the contract, the association and
the management company, intended to benefit the developer. 54 Finally,
without discussion, the court dismissed the "malpractice" complaint against
the management company, "as there was no allegation that [the management
company] was a professional, and no privity of contract alleged."'
55
This case presents developers with some interesting food for thought in
terms of structuring the contractual relationship for communities they
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Lance v. Wade, 457 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 1984)); see also Frenz
Enters, Inc. v. Port Everglades, 746 So. 2d 498, 502-03 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
147. Id.
148. 742 So. 2d 328, 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
149. Hollywood Lakes Country Club, Inc., 770 So. 2d at 718.
150. Id. at 718-19.
151. Id. at 719.
152. Id.
153. 647 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 1994).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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develop with the manager or management company that is typically retained
to administer the day-to-day affairs of the development and the association.
Although many homeowners in communities under development see the
management company as "working for the developer," in most cases the
privity of contract is between the association and the management company,
albeit under developer control. Clearly, a manager's negligence or other
tortious conduct can cause as much, perhaps more, damage to the developer
than to the association itself, since various statutory provisions and common
law theories may result in the developer, and its board appointees, being
exposed to liability claims for pre-turnover acts or omissions.
C. Attorney Malpractice Claims
Perhaps as a reminder that community association law is hardly a risk-
free endeavor, two decisions announced during the period covered by this
survey explore legal malpractice exposure for those engaged in the practice.
In decisions issued only three days apart, the first and second districts
addressed slightly different scenarios.
Hunt Ridge at Tall Pines, Inc. v. Hall'56 involved a malpractice suit
filed by a homeowners association 57 against the attorney retained by the
developer to draft the governing documents for the community and its
governing associations. 158 According to the suit, one of the declaration
supplements prepared by the Developer's attorney incorrectly listed the
owner of the property, 59 resulting in the alleged invalidity of the declaration
of covenants as to certain lots and the consequent inability to perform
anticipated duties and collect corresponding maintenance fees.
160
At issue was whether the attorney-client relationship between the
lawyer and the developer, as opposed to the developer and the association,
conferred any standing on the association for a malpractice claim, as an
intended third party beneficiary of the lawyer-client relationship. 161 Citing
the Caretta case, the second district, through Judge Threadgill, enforced
156. 766 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
157. Although not specifically stated in the opinion, it appears that this was the post-
turnover association that acted as plaintiff in the suit.
158. Hunt Ridge, 766 So. 2d at 400.
159. Allegedly the general partner of the development entity, rather than the limited
partnership which was the developer entity itself, was named.
160. Hunt Ridge, 766 So. 2d at 400.
161. Id.
162. See Caretta Trucking, 647 So. 2d at 1028.
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the long-standing legal principle that a party is an intended beneficiary to a
contract only if the parties clearly express or the contract itself expresses an
intent to primarily and directly benefit a third party.1
63
The court observed that the declaration expressly indicated that it
benefited the property owners, but made no mention of benefiting the
association. 164 Reasoning that the association is not an "owner," the party
whom benefited from the document drafting, the court concluded that the
association could not state a cause of action.
Although this case was resolved favorably from the perspective of the
developer's counsel, query whether a different result would have obtained if
individual owners had filed the suit, rather than the association. Indeed, and
although not so expressly stated by the second district, a review of the
Court's rationale could lead one to conclude that the court would have
reviewed the matter in an entirely different light, given the language in the
Declaration, which could be construed to confer third party beneficiary
status on the property owners in the development.
The flip side of the Hunt Ridge case involved a malpractice lawsuit by
unit owners in a unit-owner controlled condominium association against the
association's attorney. In Silver Dunes Condominium of Destin, Inc. v.
Beggs and Lane,166 a group of unit owners sued the association's attorney for
legal malpractice, arising out of allegedly negligent advice given to the
association relative to reconstruction of the condominium after Hurricane
167Opal, which inflicted major damage in the Florida Panhandle in 1995.
Silver Dunes, the condominium operated by the association, sustained
substantial damage after Hurricane Opal. John Daniel, an attorney with the
Law Firm of Beggs and Lane, was retained to provide advice and counsel to
the association. Ultimately, it was discovered that insurance proceeds
would not be sufficient to repair all of the damage that had been caused by
the storm.'6 9 The Board, with Daniel's assistance, announced a plan
whereby additional units would be built during the reconstruction and sold to
make up the monetary shortfalls that were expected due to insufficient
insurance proceeds. 1
70
163. Hunt Ridge, 766 So. 2d at 400.
164. Id. at 400-01.
165. Id. at 401.
166. 763 So. 2d 1274 (FIa. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
167. Id. at 1276.
168. Id. at 1275.
169 Id. at 1275-76.
170 Id. at 1276.
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Controversy erupted over the board's plan. At one point, Daniel wrote
letters to some of the individual unit owners, threatening legal action if they
did not vote in favor of the board's plan. In their suit, the unit owners
contended that the attorney provided erroneous legal advice to the board in
connection with the reconstruction expansion plan, which led to a delay in
the ultimate reconstruction of the destroyed units, and a resulting loss of
rental income to the affected owners. 72 The trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of the attorney and the law firn. 173
Citing the general rule that an attorney's liability for negligence is
generally limited to the persons with whom the attorney shares privity of
contract, the court, in its per curiam opinion, noted that a "narrow exception"
exists when the non-clients can demonstrate that they are a third-party
beneficiary of the agreement for legal services.
174
Without cited authority from other case decisions, the court went on to
observe that a condominium association is a "closely held corporation." 175
Thus, the court concluded that the issue was governed, at least in part, by a
case from the fourth district.176 On the authority of Brennan, the first district
likened the unit owners to "minority stockholders," and accordingly found
no basis to conclude that the attorney was representing the legal interests of
the individual unit owners. 177 Indeed, the court noted that it would be
unusual to argue that the attorney was representing the individual interests of
the unit owners when he had sent them letters threatening to sue them.
1 78
The relationship between a community association attorney and its unit
owners is one that is often problematic for community association
practitioners. Many unit owners and homeowners feel that they are "paying
for" the services, and therefore feel that the attorney's loyalty should be
directed to their interests. Unfortunately, the interests of the association and
particular unit owners often diverge, and an attorney cannot serve two
masters. This case is a common sense result and is consistent with other
cases involving the role of community association attorneys and the unit
171 Silver Dunes, 763 So. 2d at 1276.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1277.
174. Id. at 1276; see also Hunt Ridge, 766 So. 2d at 400.
175. Id. at 1276.
176. Silver Dunes, 763 So. 2d at 1276 (discussing Brennan v. Ruffner, 640 So. 2d 143
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
177. Id. at 1277.
178. Id.
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owners. 179 However, the case is also instructive that association lawyers
need to be constantly on the guard to insure that their representational roles
are clear, and to insure that they remain so.
D. Condominium Cases
An interesting case, apparently reviewing issues of first impression,
involves the liability of unit owners in a condominium for the negligent acts
or omissions of their association. Cooley v. Pheasant Run at Rosemont
Condominium Ass'n, Inc. 18 involved claims made by a person who was
injured on the common elements of the condominium, while a guest at the
condominium.
181
However, in addition to suing the Association as a corporate entity, the
plaintiff also sued each unit owner individually.18 2 The trial court dismissed
the action against the individual unit owners, with prejudice, and indeed
suggested that it would favorably entertain .motions filed pursuant to section
57.105 of the Florida Statutes, which provides sanctions for frivolous
litigation. 183 On appeal before the fifth district, Judge Cobb writing for the
panel, examined the provisions of section 718.119 of the Florida Statutes.'84
Finding the issue to be one of "legislative intent," 185 the court reasoned that
179. See, e.g., Ocean Club of Palm Beach Shores Condo. Ass'n v. Estate of Daly, 504
So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
180. 781 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
181. Id. at 1183.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Same provides:
Limitation of liability.-
(1) The liability of the owner of a unit for common expenses is limited to the
amounts for which he or she is assessed for common expenses from time to time in
accordance with this chapter, the declaration, and bylaws.
(2) The owner of a unit may be personally liable for the acts or omissions of the
association in relation to the use of the common elements, but only to the extent of his
or her pro rata share of that liability in the same percentage as his or her interest in the
common elements, and then in no case shall that liability exceed the value of his or her
unit.
(3) In any legal action in which the association may be exposed to liability in excess
of insurance coverage protecting it and the unit owners, the association shall give
notice of the exposure within a reasonable time to all unit owners, and they shall have
the right to intervene and defend.
Id. at 1183-84.
185. Cooley, 781 So. 2d at 1184.
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the requirement that an association give notice to unit owners of potential
liability in excess of insurance proceeds was indicative of the intention that
the unit owner would not be an original party to the action, otherwise such
notice would not be necessary.' 86 The court found the focus of section
718.119 of the Florida Statutes to stand for the proposition that the
association, as a corporate entity, would be the party liable for personal
injuries on the condominium common elements, while the individual unit
owners would be liable for assessments proportionate to such damage, up to
the value of the unit.187 Citing cases relative to a condominium association's
• 189
status as a defendant in class action proceedings, 188 the court found that
the association, and only the association, would serve as the appropriate
defensive class representative in matters of this nature.'9 The result in this
case is consistent with the apparent legislative intent of section 718.119 of
the Florida Statutes, which the court found to be less than "clear-cut," and is
also consistent with the unique feature of condominium associations' 91
As noted previously, the introduction of mandatory, non-binding
arbitration for most condominium "disputes" has resulted in a paucity of
appellate cases exploring the limits of the dos and don'ts of condominium
living. However, exploration of the limits of arbitrators' jurisdiction
continue to emanate from the courts. 192 Florida Tower Condominium, Inc. v.
Mindes,193 authored by Chief Judge Schwartz, dealt with a controversy over
the right to use a particular parking space at the condominium. 94 Finding
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Graves v. Ciega Verde Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1997); Kesl, Inc. v. Racquet Club of Deer Creek II Condo, Inc., 574 So. 2d 251 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
189. While apparently disagreeing with the trial court's perception that the issue was so
clear-cut so as to invoke section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes.
190. Cooley, 781 So. 2d at 1184.
191. Id. See The Florida Bar, 353 So. 2d 95, 97 (Fla. 1977); Avila South Condo.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599, 608 (Fla. 1977).
192. See Neate v. Cypress Club Condo. Inc., 718 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
Dist. 1998); Ruffin v. Kingswood E Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 719 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998); Clark v. England, 715 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Summit Towers
Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Coren, 707 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Carlandia
Corporation v. Obernauer, 695 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Seamaan v. Sea
Ranch Club Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 695 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Blum v.
Tamarac Fairways Ass'n, Inc., 684 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
193. 770 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
194. Id. at 211.
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that because the statutory definition of "dispute"1 95 does not include
disagreements that involve "title to a unit or any common element," the court
ruled that such controversies were not arbitrable, and that original jurisdic-
tion for the adjudication of such claims therefore lies in the courts. 196 Noting
that the Arbitration Section of the Department of Business and Professional
Regulation has, nonetheless, accepted jurisdiction over a variety of parking
assignment disputes,197 the court "decline[d] to follow [those] contrary
decisions of arbitrators." ' '
It can be argued that the court ascribed a definition to the term "title"
which is different from the use of that term in normal legal parlance. 199 Since
common elements by their nature are not "owned" by individual unit
owners, 2no the legal basis for concluding that a disagreement as to who may
use a parking space involves "title" is perhaps debatable. However, unless
addressed in a contrary fashion by the Legislature, or treated differently
outside of the third district, practitioners should add to their rule enforce-
ment checklist the existence of this case in jurisdictional determination. The
case of Schooner Oaks Ltd. Co. v. Schooner Oaks Condominium Ass'n,
Inc.,2°1 is the latest in the "phantom unit cases" rising out of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal20 2 which appears to address the "phantom issue"
differently than the second district. Schooner Oaks Limited Company
("Schooner Oaks") constructed Schooner Oaks Condominium, a phase
condominium, "which ultimately consisted of four phases." 204  When
Schooner Oaks stopped making payments on unconstructed units, Schooner
Oaks Condominium Association, Inc. ("Association") initiated foreclosure
action against the unconstructed units.2°5 The trial court entered summary
195. FLA. STAT. § 718.1255(1) (2001).
196. Florida Tower, 770 So. 2d at 211.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 211 n.1.
199. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (6th ed. 1990) (defining title to include "the
union of all the elements which constitute ownership").
200. FLA. STAT. § 718.106(2)(a) (2001).
201. 776 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
202. See also RIS Inv. Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 695 So. 2d
357 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Welleby Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. The William Lyon Co., 522
So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). Cf. Winkelman v. Toll, 661 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
203. See Estancia Condo. Ass'n v. Sunfield Homes, Inc., 619 So. 2d 1008, 1010 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Hyde Park Condo. Ass'n v. Estero Island Real Estate, Inc., 486 So.
2d 1, 2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
204. Schooner Oaks, 776 So. 2d at 305.
205. Id.
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judgment finding that Schooner Oaks was liable for assessments on the
unconstructed "units," from which order Schooner Oaks appealed.2°
On appeal, the central issue was whether unimproved land was subject
to assessments.m7 As the grant of a summary judgment was on appeal, the
court, in its per curiam opinion, felt constrained to review the matter in a
light most favorable to Schooner Oaks.208  In reviewing the various
provisions of the declaration of condominium, which largely tracks statutory
definitions verbatim, the court concluded that a reasonable inference could
be drawn that "units" were created immediately upon a new phase being
added, regardless of the phase of construction.t2
9
However, the court noted that section four of the Declaration of
Condominium, which defines the "unit boundaries," supported a different
conclusion. 1 Recognizing that these "boundaries" did not exist, the court
ruled that a genuine issue of material fact as to the intention of the
declaration of condominium was presented.21 1  The court held that the
declaration permitted differing reasonable inferences, and thus remanded the
case to the trial court for plenary proceedings. 12
This case, although perhaps judicious in terms of summary judgment
standards, continues the judicial trend in the fourth district, which fails to
recognize that in condominiums, there are only two types of property,
common elements and units. Property that is submitted to a declaration must
be one or the other, it can not be neither, nor can it be both. In fact, after the
fourth district's Welleby decision, the statute was specifically amended to
provide that upon the recording of a declaration, or an amendment adding a
phase to the terms of the declaration, all units described in the declaration or
phase amendment as being located in or on the land then being submitted to
condominium ownership shall come into existence "regardless of the state of
completion of planned improvements in which the units may be located. 213
Although it was not stated in the opinion whether this declaration pre-dates
or post-dates the 1990 amendment to the statute, it appears that the views of
the Fourth District continue demonstrating the court's hesitation to impose
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 306.
209. Schooner Oaks, 776 So. 2d at 306.
210. The boundary definition in this declaration contained typical "interior shell"
definitions, with the "unit" being encompassed within the perimeter walls, floors, and ceilings.
Id. at 305-06.
211. Schooner Oaks, 776 So. 2d at 306.
212. Id.
213. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (2001).
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liability on raw land. If this case is litigated again to appeal after remand, it
will certainly be interesting to see how the court resolves the issues,
particularly to the extent that a post-1990 condominium may be involved.21 4
In Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. The Gardens North Condominium
Ass'n, Inc. ,25 the quality of title obtained after foreclosure of a condomin-
ium lien, where service of process was subsequently contested, was at
issue.216 In 1997, the bank purchased the subject unit at a foreclosure sale.217
The association alleged that, thereafter, the bank failed to pay assess-
218ments. The association filed a lien and subsequent action to foreclose on
the same.219 Nationsbanc did not file a response to the complaint and a
default judgment was ultimately entered. 220 The foreclosure sale was held
on March 2, 1998, and a third-party bidder purchased the unit.221
Nearly a year later, the bank moved to quash service of process and
dismiss the complaint.222 Nationsbanc alleged that service of process was
defective, specifically that service was effectuated on an administrative
223
assistant in violation of section 48.081 of the Florida Statutes. The
association responded that the attempt of service was voidable, not void.2
24
The trial court found service to be facially defective, but refused to grant
NationBanc's motion to vacate the sale and void the certificate of title.223
Stating that it was undisputed that the association did not comply with
the statute applicable to service of process on corporations, Judge Polen,
writing for the court, held that as statutes governing service of process must
be strictly construed, attempted service on a random employee without a
showing of necessity negated the court's personal jurisdiction over the
226defendant corporation.
214. The RIS decision also involved a pre-1990 Declaration of Condominium. RIS
Inv. Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'1 Regulation, 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
215. 764 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
216. Id. at 844.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp., 764 So. 2d at 884.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. ld.
225. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp., 764 So. 2d at 884.
226. Id. at 884-85 (citing York Communications, Inc. v. Furst Group Inc., 724 So. 2d
678 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
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Distinguishing cases where a judgment is only voidable where service
of process does not violate the essential requirements of law, the court
concluded that the association's attempted service was facially void, as the
affidavit accompanying the proof of service did not contain any statement of
supporting the necessity of substitute service on a random employee.227
Obviously, the consequences for insurers of title, the foreclosure sale
purchaser, and the association itself in a case of this nature could be
substantial. Since the statute of limitations in a matter of this nature would
appear to be seven years,228 exposure to the foreclosing associations and the
attorney handling the case could continue for a substantial period of time.
Attorneys handling association foreclosure cases should view this case as
inducement to insure that the foreclosure checklist includes verification of
appropriate service of process in every collections case before it is taken to
foreclosure judgment and sale.
E. Homeowners' Association and Covenant Cases
Another decision involving the occasional legal no man's land of
undeveloped phases of a development is Villages at Mango Key v. Hunter
Development, Inc.229 At issue in Villages at Mango Key was voting rights
for lands that were originally intended to be reserved as potential future
development in the Mango Key development.230 Vacations Villages of
American Inc. ("VVA") purchased Tract A of Lindfields Unit Six, which231,
consisted of 18.89 acres. It replatted a portion of this land into "Villages
at Mango Key," consisting of thirty-three platted townhouse lots. 232 An
exhibit to the Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions reflected eighty-
eight additional proposed lots in the unplatted portion of Tract A, which was
set aside for future development. 233 VVA's interest in the undeveloped
portion of the project was ultimately foreclosed, and purchased out of
foreclosure by a company who ultimately sold it to Hunter Development
227. Id. at 885.
228. See FLA. STAT. § 95.12 (2001).
229. 763 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
230. Id. at 477.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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("Hunter").234 Hunter obtained approval to develop 236 condominium units
on the land, including additional adjoining land owned by Hunter.235
Desiring to use the amenities servicing the Village at Mango Key,
Hunter took the position that its purchase of the lands set aside for future
phases entitled it to eighty-eight votes (the maximum number of potential
236lots), which thus would entitle it to control of the homeowners association.
The trial court agreed with Hunter's position.
237
In reversing the trial court, Judge Harris writing for the court, opined
that the definition of a "lot, 238 contained in the original governing documents
was key to the adjudication of the issue.239 Finding that the voting rights
appurtenant to "lots" was limited to the actual "Villages" development, or
lands "subsequently added to the project," the court found that the
attachment reserving the lands in question for future development was not a
"recorded subdivision map" sufficient to grant voting rights.No The court's
reasoning was that there were no lots specifically described, but rather a
large developable tract of land.21 The court found that Hunter was "at best
the fee simple owner of acreage which may or may not be developed into
townhouse lots." 242
Had the court stopped here, it seems clear that its decision was well-
founded and based upon the intent of the documents and normal allocation
of rights and interests in potential future phases of typical real estate
developments. The court arguably going a step farther than it needed to,
went on to find that the proposed construction of substantially more
condominium units than would have been permitted under the original plan
"reveals most convincingly that the foreclosure of the Developer's interest in
the property released the unplatted land from the Developer's proposed
expansion of the Villages project. '243  The court found that Hunter
abandoned the right to develop the property as part of Villages of Mango
234. Villages of Mango Key, 763 So. 2d at 477.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The Declaration provided: "'Lot" shall mean and refer to any plot of land on
which a Living Unit may be constructed as shown on any recorded subdivision map of the
Property or which may hereafter be platted or otherwise created .. " Id. at 477-78. "'Liv-
ing Unit" is defined as a "townhouse residence."' Villages of Mango Key, 763 So. 2d at 478.
239. Id. at 478.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Villages of Mango Key, 763 So. 2d at 478.
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Key by converting the property to condominium project. 244 It is perhaps
troubling that the court looked at the foreclosure as the act eliminating the
developer's interest in the potential future phases pertaining to Villages of
Mango Key. Obviously, when developments go sour, the lender or fore-
closure purchaser, who may wish to continue the original scheme of
development, wants to be sure that a foreclosure will not extinguish reserved
rights under the documents. Although the court's statement is perhaps dicta,
it is a lesson for document drafters that clear reservation of use rights and the
provision for what shall or may happen if potential future phases are put to
different uses than originally anticipated, are key elements in drafting initial
project documentation.
Although primarily presented as an agency case, Lensa Corporation v.
Poinciana Gardens Ass'n, Inc.245 is perhaps most enlightening as to the
difference in judicial treatment between condominium associations and
homeowners associations. Although Florida's appellate courts have suggest-
ed that it takes unanimous approval for a condominium association to build a
new swimming pool,2 6 or obtain super majority approval to change the color
of a condominium building's paint,2 7 the Lensa court suggests that the board
of directors of a homeowners association has the authority to sell all of the
property and assets of the Association.2
8
The president of the Association, Dr. Goodman, negotiated and agreed
to sell substantially all of the association's assets, consisting of land, to a
company called BBG Appraiser Co. ("BBG"), which was owned by Ms.
Sandel. 9 It was understood that BBG would assign its contract rights to
Lensa Corporation, which would develop the property.2 0
The parties executed an agreement, which Dr. Goodman signed on
behalf of the Association. 2 1 After discovering that Dr. Goodman's signature
had been witnessed by Mr. Sandel (also the owner of Lensa), Dr. Goodman
was asked to execute a second contract to avoid any problems.252 Prior to
that time, however, Mr. Sandel had a discussion with Ms. Stole, the secretary
244. Id.
245. 765 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
246. See Downey v. Jungle Den Villas Recreation Ass'n, 525 So. 2d 438, 441-42 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988). It is likely that this aspect of Jungle Den is no longer good law.
247. Islandia Condo. Ass'n v. Vermut, 501 So. 2d 741, 743 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1987)
248. Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 298.
249. Id. at 297.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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of the homeowner's association board. 3  Ms. Stole apparently told Mr.
Sandel that she was not aware that a sales contract existed for the sale of the
land. 54 In response to Mr. Sandel's concerns, Dr. Goodman assured him
that he would straighten out the matter with the board.2 5
5
Consequently, a board meeting was held to address the issue.25
6
According to the court's opinion, it was undisputed that a quorum was not in
attendance for this meeting. 7 Those who were in attendance agreed that
Dr. Goodman was authorized to sign the purchase documents for the sum of
$50,000.258 The signed minutes of the meeting were subsequently faxed to
Mr. Sandel, and several days later, a second contract, identical to the first,
was entered into.2 59 Thereafter, the board elected a new president, and
informed Mr. Sandel that the contract would not be honored because the
selling price was too low.26 Lensa filed a breach of contract action against
the Association.26'
Lensa conceded during the jury trial of the case that Dr. Goodman did
not have actual authority to sell the property and that the board had not
approved it.262  The jury entered a verdict in favor of Lensa, totaling
$18,000, finding that Dr. Goodman had apparent authority to sign the
263agreement. The trial court granted the Association's motion for directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding that Dr. Goodman
had no actual authority because the true board of directors did not vote on
the agreement.264 Further, the trial court ruled that Dr. Goodman failed to
obtain the approval of the directors as required under the Association's
bylaws,265 as well as section 617.1202 of the Florida Statutes.266 Judge
253. Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 297.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 297.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 297.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
Sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of corporate property and assets requiring
member approval.-
A sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the property
and assets of a corporation, in all cases other than those not requiring member approval
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Stone, writing for the court's majority, found that because the bylaws did not
require membership approval, the directors had the authority to sell the
property and assets of the corporation.267 It being undisputed that the board
never approved the transaction, the court then concluded that any liability of
the Association would need to based on Dr. Goodman's apparent author-
ity.2 68  Discussing the traditional elements of apparent authority, the court
held that because sale of the Association's property was not in the ordinary
course of business, there could be no presumed authority that Dr. Goodman
had the authority to act for the Association. 69 Accordingly, in the absence
of representation from the Board that Dr. Goodman was authorized to act in
this capacity, the court concluded that there was not representation by the
purported principal, the Board, as to the agent's, the president's, authority.2
as specified in ss. 617.1201, may be made upon such terms and conditions and for
such consideration, which may consist in whole or in part of money or property, real or
personal, including shares, bonds, or other securities of any corporation or corporations
for profit, domestic or foreign, and must be authorized in the following manner
(1) If the corporation has members entitled to vote on the sale, lease, exchange, or other
disposition of corporate property, the board of directors must adopt a resolution ap-
proving such sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition, and directing that it be submit-
ted to a vote at a meeting of members entitled to vote thereon, which may be either an
annual or special meeting. Written notice stating that the purpose, or one of the pur-
poses, of such meeting is to consider the sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of
all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation must be given to
each member entitled to vote at such meeting in accordance with the articles of incor-
poration or the bylaws. At such meeting, the members may authorize such sale, lease,
exchange, or other disposition and may approve or fix, or may authorize the board of
directors to fix, any or all of the terms and conditions thereof and the consideration to
be received by the corporation therefor. Such authorization requires at least a majority
of the votes which members present at such meeting or represented by proxy are
entitled to cast. After such authorization by a vote of members, the board of directors
may, in its discretion, abandon such sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of
assets, subject to the rights of third parties under any contracts relating to such sale,
lease, exchange, or other disposition, without further action or approval by members.
(2) If the corporation has no members or if its members are not entitled to vote thereon,
a sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of all or substantially all the property and
assets of a corporation may be authorized by a majority vote of the directors then in
office.
FtA. STAT. § 617.1202 (2001).
267. Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 298.
268. Id.
269. Id. See Ideal Foods, Inc. v. Action Leasing Corp., 413 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
270. Id.
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Judge Gross, specially concurring, agreed with the conclusion that
apparent authority had not been demonstrated by Lensa.271 Judge Gross,
noting the absence of a corporate resolution and the absence of a history of
completed deals between the parties that would give rise to apparent
authority, found there was no formal act by the board which would denote
the holding out of Dr. Goodman as possessing the authority to act on the
Association's behalf.
272
While the decision appears to accomplish justice, at least from the
perspective of the Association, there are a couple of aspects that are
noteworthy to the practitioner. First, in most dealings with community
Associations, the authority of the board president to bind the corporation is
often accepted as a given. This case demonstrates, at least when actions do
not involve the ordinary course of business, the practitioner should acquire
additional indicia of the president's authority, such as a board resolution,
signed minutes, and the like.
2 73
Perhaps of greater theoretical interest is the court's suggestion that had
a full quorum of the board been at the meeting where the second contract
was authorized, the action would have been a valid act of the Association.
274
Keeping in mind that common properties for homeowners associations are
often a central nature of the homeowners' investment in the community
recreational facilities, open spaces, etc., one can certainly question the
wisdom of applying the general provisions of the Florida Not-for-Profit
Corporation Statute relevant to asset disposition, and to disposition of the
275
common areas of a homeowners association.
In what the court described as a "classic case of waiver," Judge
Orfinger, writing for the Fifth District Court of Appeal in the Woodlands
Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Darrow,276 reviewed a neighborhood dispute regarding
the use of property, which had been originally deed restricted to residential
use and which- was being used as a chiropractor's office.277 The deed
restriction in question278 had apparently been in effect for a number of
271. Id.
272. Id. at 299 (Gross, J., concurring).
273 Lensa, 765 So. 2d at 298. Especially true where the magnitude of the transaction
or undertaking justifies same.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 765 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
277 Id. at 875.
278. In pertinent part:
No lot shall be used except for residential* purposes. No building shall be erected,
altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached single family
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years.279 Prior to acquisition of the property in question by Dr. Darrow, the
property had been used for the conduct of a real estate business, including
exterior parking signage indicating that the property was used primarily for
commercial purposes.i According to the court, the real estate business had
been conducted on the property since 1989.
281
When Dr. Darrow decided to purchase the property for his chiroprac-
tor's office, it came to his attention that the president of the voluntary
homeowners' association which existed in the development was not happy
about his plans, although Association representatives apparently told Dr.
Darrow there was nothing they felt they could legally do to stop him.282
After Dr. Darrow closed on the property in 1996 and began his chiropractic
practice, the homeowners association 283 and three individual property owners
filed suit against Dr. Darrow. 3 4 At trial, testimony was adduced to the effect
that prior to Dr. Darrow's acquisition, for at least seven years, the property
had openly and notoriously been used for commercial, not residential,
purposes.2 5 For example, Dr. Darrow's predecessor undertook substantial
renovations in 1993 and 1994, all geared toward the property's commercial
utilization, without objection from the Association, which took no action to
stop it.
286
The appellate court began its opinion by noting that the trial court,
apparently attempting to fashion a solution that it hoped would make all
parties happy, made no findings in its final order denying enforcement of the
dwelling not to exceed two stories in height and a private garage for not more than two
cars.
No building shall be erected, placed or altered on any lot until the construction plans
and specifications and a plan allowing the location of the structure have been approved
by the Architectural Control Committee as to quality of workmanship and materials,
harmony of external design with existing structures and as to location with respect to
topography and finish grade elevation.
Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 875.
282. Id. at 876.
283. See Palm Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Pisarski, 626 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1993)
(indicating it is not clear as to the legal basis upon which the association filed suit).
284. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 874.
285. Id. at 876.
286. Id. at 875. Even though the association was aware of the work, as evidenced by
testimony of a telephone call between the then president of the association and Dr. Darrow's
predecessor. Id.
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restrictions. 217 On the authority of Home Depot U.S.A. v. Taylor,28 8 the Fifth
District concluded that it was obligated to uphold the trial court's conclusion
if it was correct for any reason.2 9  After quotation of black letter law
regarding waiver of enforcement of restrictive covenants,29 the standards
required to demonstrate waiver,291 and Supreme Court cases from Indiana 292
and Mississippi,293 the court concluded, without embellishment, that the
substantial delay in objecting to the commercial use of the property resulted
in a waiver of the restriction and that the doctrine of laches likewise barred
enforcement of the covenant.294
Although the voiding of a covenant running with the land is a harsh
result, enforcement of covenants lies largely within the equity jurisdiction of
the court. While the appellate panel seemed to gently criticize the trial
judge for ruling in favor of Dr. Darrow simply based upon an oral pro-
nouncement that it would be inequitable to enforce the restriction.296 It is
equally obvious that the appellate court did not fundamentally disagree that
297
enforcement of the covenant would be inequitable in this case. Although
the concept is not particularly well-developed in the published decision,
implicit in the court's holding is that laches will defeat a covenant's
enforceability when there is injury flowing from the non-action.298 Here, the
Association and the neighbors sat by idly for years while the property was
used for commercial purposes, was substantially improved, and then
299subsequently sold to Dr. Darrow.
Another pair of cases involving deed restrictions and voluntary
homeowners associations are Cudjoe Gardens Property Owners Ass'n, Inc.
v. Payne,300 (Cudjoe I) and Cudjoe Gardens Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v.
287. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 876.
288. 676 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
289. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 876.
290. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Covenants § 239 (1995).
291. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 876-77 (citing Taylor v. Kenco Chem. & Mfg. Corp.,
465 So. 2d 581, 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
292. Wischmeyer v. Finch, 107 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. 1952).
293. Twin States Realty Co., v. Kilpatrick, 26 So. 2d 356 (Miss. 1946).
294. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 877.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Woodlands, 765 So. 2d at 875.
300. 770 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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Payne,3m (Cudjoe II). In Cudjoe I, standing of the plaintiff Association was
at issue.3°2 The Association was seeking to enforce a deed restriction that
included minimum setback requirements against the Paynes. °3 Because the
property owners association was a voluntary organization, the Paynes moved
to dismiss the complaint based upon the Association's lack of standing and
on the authority of a 1993 case decided by the Supreme Court of Florida.3°
In reversing the trial court's order of dismissal, the Cudjoe I Court,
through Judge Ramirez, distinguished the standing of the Association in the
instant dispute from that in Palm Point, because the Cudjoe Association
owned a platted lot within the subdivision.305  Although the lot was
apparently not buildable, the third district held that same would not defeat
the Association's standing as a property owner to enforce the deed
restrictions. The appellate court remanded the cause to the trial court with
instructions that the Association should be granted standing to pursue relief,
resulting in Cudjoe 11.306
After remand, the Cudjoe II trial judge again entered judgment against
the Association, this time on the grounds that the deed restrictions, as
previously amended by a majority vote of the property owners and as
authorized by the original deed restriction, were void. The written ballots
of the property owners did not comply with the two witness requirement of
Florida's version of the Statute Deeds, section 689.01 of the Florida
303Statutes. The appellate court's opinion, written by Chief Judge Schwartz,
301. 779 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
302. Cudjoe 1, 770 So. 2d at 190.
303. Id.
304. Id. (discussing Palm Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Pisarski, 626 So. 2d 195
(Fla. 1993).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 190-91.
307. Cudjoe 1I, 779 So. 2d at 598.
308. In pertinent part:
No estate or interest of freehold, or for a term of more than 1 year, or any uncertain
interest of, in or out of any messages, lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be
created, made, granted, transferred or released in any other manner than by instrument
in writing, signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses by the party creating,
making, granting, conveying, transferring or releasing such estate, interest, or term of
more than I year, or by the party's agent thereunto lawfully authorized, unless by will
and testament, or other testamentary appointment, duly made according to law; and no
estate or interest, either of freehold, or of term of more than 1 year, or any uncertain
interest of, in, to or out of any messages, lands, tenements or hereditaments, shall be
assigned or surrendered unless it be by instrument signed in the presence of two
subscribing witnesses by the party so assigning or surrendering, or by the party's agent
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found it clear that deed restrictions of this type are "simply equitable rights
arising out of the contractual relationship between and among the property
owners and emphatically do not constitute interest in real estate which §
689.01 applies.
Although both Cudjoe I and Cudjoe II do not recite facts which enable
the reader of the decision to comprehend the precise nature of the underlying
disputes involving the setback controversy, it does appear that amendments
to the deed restrictions may have been involved. While the condominium
statute 31 contains clear guidance as to the procedure for certifying amend-
ments to condominium documents, there is no parallel guidance in the statute
311
applicable to homeowners associations. Obviously, it remains necessary
for those seeking to amend deed restrictions to comply with the amendatory
procedures contained therein,312 but this case provides safe harbor from
adherence to the technicalities of conveyancing laws applicable to real
property transfers at least where not specifically required.
Sugarmill Woods Oaks Village Association, Inc. v. Wires313 involves the
following issue:
Does the issuance of a tax deed to a lot extinguish a homeowner as-
sociation's lien placed on such lot, pursuant to a declaration of
covenants, recorded prior to issuance of the tax deed, where the
declaration provided for homeowner association liens to be placed
on lots for delinquent homeowner association assessments, and the
homeowners association recorded a lien pursuant to the declaration
prior to the issuance of the tax deed? 314
thereunto lawfully authorized, or by the act and operation of law. No seal shall be
necessary to give validity to any instrument executed in conformity with this section.
Corporations may convey in accordance with the provisions of this section or in
accordance with the provisions of sections 692.01 and 692.02 of the Florida Statutes.
FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (2000).
309. Cudjoe II, 779 So. 2d at 598-99. Cudjoe I states that a setback requirement was in
controversy.
310. FLA. STAT. § 718.110 (2000).
311. FLA. STAT. § 720.301 (2000).
312. Cudjoe II, 779 So. 2d at 598. Many covenants applicable to homeowners
associations and other non-condominium deed restricted communities do require recordation
of individual lot owner consents. Id.
313. 766 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
314. Id. at 488.
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'The trial court ruled that the liens were extinguished. 315 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal, through Judge Sharp, agreed, and affirmed the trial court.
316
According to the court's opinion, the case turned solely on the interpretation
of applicable statutes. 3' 7 The court first considered a 1973 amendment to
section 197.552 of the Florida Statutes,31 8 which governs tax deeds. The
1973 amendment to the statute provided that "[n]o right, interest, restriction,
or other covenant shall survive the issuance of a tax deed. 319 In 1979, this
provision was amended to exempt from tax deeds extinguishment, a lien of
record held by a municipality or governmental unit.320 In the same Act, the
legislature also amended section 197.573 of the Florida Statutes, to provide
that certain restrictions and covenants would survive issuance of a tax
321deed . Subsection 2 of the law limited those restrictions that survived to
322
usual restrictions and covenants limiting the use of property. However, the
1979 law also specifically provided that the limited exception for survival of
restrictions or covenants "shall not protect covenants creating any debt or
lien against or upon the property... .,,323 After considering the legislative
history of the 1979 amendments, the court concluded that the obvious public
policy of the 1979 amendments was to allow local governments to protect
their taxing basis by limiting those financial obligations that would survive
issuance of a tax deed.3u
The gravamen of the issue in the Sugarmill Woods case involved a 1995
amendment to section 617.312 of the Florida Statutes.3"s The 1995
amendment was, according to the court, enacted in recognition of the need
for homeowners associations to provide governance to the communities
encumbered by plats or declarations.32 The 1995 amendment provided, in
pertinent part, that all "provisions of a declaration of covenants relating to
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Sugarmill Woods Oaks Village Ass'n v. Wires, 766 So. 2d at 487, 488 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing ch. 73-332, § 21, 1973 Fla. Laws).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 489 (citing ch. 79-334, § 1, 1979 Fla. Laws).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Sugarmill Woods, 766 So. 2d at 489. See also Gainer v. Fiddlesticks Country
Club, Inc., 710 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
324. Sugarmill Woods, 766 So. 2d at 489.
325. Id. (citing renumbered FLA. STAT. § 720.312 (2000)).
326. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 617.312 (1995)).
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the parcel that has been sold for taxes survive the tax deed., 327 The issue for
the court was whether the provisions of a declaration of covenants relating to
a parcel included assessments accruing against the lot prior to the tax deed
sale.32 The court held that it did not.3 9 The court further opined that the
intent of the statute was obvious, and even though assessments accruing
prior to issuance of the tax deed would be extinguished, assessments
accruing in futuro would be preserved. 330  The court's distinction of the
difference between "covenants" and "assessments" is founded on sound
legal principles. 331 The court's interpretation of the 1995 amendment to the
statute applicable to homeowners associations strikes a proper balance
between the interests of municipalities in encouraging the purchase of tax
certificates and the needs of the homeowner association to insure that the
right to collect assessments against a particular lot is not abolished in
perpetuity. 33  Although one may argue that the equities should lie with the
Association,333 the situation is no different than in typical mortgage
foreclosure situations where the lien of the Association is typically inferior
to the lien of the mortgagee, either by declaration proviso
334 or statute.335
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. Sugarmill Woods, 766 So. 2d at 489.
330. Id.
331. Palm Beach Polo, Inc. v. Hill, 757 So. 2d 1287, 1288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
332. Sugarnill Woods, 766 So. 2d at 489-90.
333. The association is, after all, continuing to provide services to benefit the property,
for which the other homeowners must then pay.
334. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. McKesson, 639 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
335. See FLA. STAT. § 718.116(1) (2000).
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